

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

\*State Department review completed

25X1

**Top Secret** 


4 June 1971

Approved For Release 2003/08/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2

4 June 1971

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

**CONTENTS** 



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/08/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2

YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE'S EXPLORATIONS OF MILITARY COOPERATION WITH ITALY IN RECENT MONTHS REFLECT A DESIRE TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION OF NATO POWERS TO YUGOSLAVIA'S ISOLATED MILITARY POSITION.

25X1

YUGOSLAV DEFENSE MINISTER LJUBICIC IN APRIL EMPHA-SIZED COMMON DEFENSE NEEDS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE. SINCE THEN, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHES IN ROME AND VIENNA HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE CONSIDERING A FORMAL DEFENSE ALLIANCE.

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BELGRADE IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUCH AN AGREEMENT, OR THAT IT EXPECTS ITALY
TO DO SO. RATHER, THE YUGOSLAVS MAY BE ANGLING FOR
SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD ASSURE THEM
THAT THEY ARE NOT WITHOUT FRIENDS. THEY PROBABLY
ALSO BELIEVE THAT THESE TACTICS WILL IMPROVE THEIR
CHANCES OF ACQUIRING WESTERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

YUGOSLAVS GENUINELY FEAR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION DURING THE EVENTUAL TRANSITION PERIOD AFTER
TITO DIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO HARD INFORMATION
TO CONFIRM SUCH A THREAT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BASIC FEELING
OF INSECURITY HAS BEEN FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY THE
GROWING OBSOLESCENCE OF ITS MILITARY HARDWARE AND
ITS INABILITY TO FUND PURCHASES OF NEW WESTERN EQUIPMENT. BELGRADE'S STRICT ADHERENCE TO ITS POLICY
OF NONALIGNMENT HAS DEPRIVED IT OF MEANINGFUL MILITARY TIES IN EAST OR WEST AND IT NOW APPEARS TO BE
ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP WAYS WHICH WILL MAKE IT LESS
VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURES FROM THE EAST.

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1	Top Secret	-2

**Top Secret**